Iran, US and Obama
“We will extend our hand if they unclench their fist”; this was the first statement by Obama, after he took office, about the new administration’s policy toward Iran. Later, new secretary of state, Hillary Clinton said that all options continue to be on the table as were on Bush administration’s table before, but again emphasizing just literally on diplomatic efforts, somewhat more than Condoleezza Rice.
I could hardly believe that Obama has had enough time to spend on Iran up to now being overwhelmed by the global economic crisis. But it seems quite apparent that no breakthrough change of policy is on his agenda right now.
Words could no longer work. Sending messages to the Iranian people, such as this latest one for the celebration of new Persian year and Nowrooz, would not make any difference. Iranian leaders have sent similar messages to the American nation frequently prior to this. However everything is virtually unchanged. Every side asks the other side to step first. But no side will move first as it has been the case over the last three decades.
I think, as I wrote in a previous posting, current Iranian leaders will only accept an irrefutable offer. They will never be the first mover. Therefore what I do suggest to the American government is to extend his hand if they would like to give a chance of solution to the problem of Iran-US relations. Hereby I am going to reason for this recommendation in economic terms and upon making comparison between the mutual influences of the two governments.
On the one hand it seems that Islamic Republic’s policies, haranguing and literal enmity toward the United States has had negligible negative effect on the American economy if one takes into account the scale of the American market and its correlations to the rest of the world. Perhaps the major hostile action of I.R. was the 1979 hostage crisis of American Embassy in Tehran. Yet that event and a few other terrorist attacks believed to be committed by groups affiliated or within the power structure of I.R. appear to have had more pronounced political consequences rather than economic effects. Moreover, Iran has continued to sell its oil in the global market, never using it as a political weapon up to now, despite occasional claims from government people. In military arms market, while I.R. has been drawn to the Russian/Chinese products, Middle East Arab countries has replaced Iran as excellent costumers for the American arms producers, spending multiple billion of dollars thanks to the continuous instability in the region. In the meantime, American products reach to the hand of Iranian consumers indirectly through multiple mediators at high prices.
On the other hand, Iranian economy has suffered on multiple sides. Firstly, Iranian properties in the US were blocked due to hostage crisis. Secondly the economic embargo has been kept in place by the US government over three decades of hostility. Thirdly the American governments backed Saddam’s regime militarily during the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war which resulted in the devastation of Iran’s economy and over a million death tolls on the Iranian side. Last but not least, I.R. hostile haranguing toward the US over the years has caused a tense atmosphere in Iranian foreign relations with the other western powers. Due to such tense atmosphere, foreign investment has continued to be nearly nil over the years. Moreover advanced technologies are either banned or paid through the nose to the mediators or replaced by poor Chinese or Russian alternatives, followed in turn by problematic working or development of critical industries such as oil/gas production, power plants, air aviation, etc. Nationwide power plants could hardly produce to their half capacity mostly due to lack of spare parts; sanctions on aviation devices have forced the government to lean toward second-hand Russian or Ukrainian airplanes and poor maintenance of the existing fleet, leading to frequent air crashes. Typical examples are numerous.
In general, the US-laid embargo not only terribly decelerated the economic growth of the nation, but also has changed, in effect, nothing in Islamic Republic’s political trends and stances, if not worsened it.
On the other side of the equation, could anybody give examples of similar effects of I.R. policies on the American economy? I would not wonder if a positive effect emerges at the end of a thorough scientific investigation.
From the Iranian nations’ point of view, Iran is and has continued to be the obvious loser of the equation, insisting on its hard-line stances up to day. Now, I would like to ask American policy-makers, whether it is still wise to wait for the Iranian side to unclench its fist first or not.
I could hardly believe that Obama has had enough time to spend on Iran up to now being overwhelmed by the global economic crisis. But it seems quite apparent that no breakthrough change of policy is on his agenda right now.
Words could no longer work. Sending messages to the Iranian people, such as this latest one for the celebration of new Persian year and Nowrooz, would not make any difference. Iranian leaders have sent similar messages to the American nation frequently prior to this. However everything is virtually unchanged. Every side asks the other side to step first. But no side will move first as it has been the case over the last three decades.
I think, as I wrote in a previous posting, current Iranian leaders will only accept an irrefutable offer. They will never be the first mover. Therefore what I do suggest to the American government is to extend his hand if they would like to give a chance of solution to the problem of Iran-US relations. Hereby I am going to reason for this recommendation in economic terms and upon making comparison between the mutual influences of the two governments.
On the one hand it seems that Islamic Republic’s policies, haranguing and literal enmity toward the United States has had negligible negative effect on the American economy if one takes into account the scale of the American market and its correlations to the rest of the world. Perhaps the major hostile action of I.R. was the 1979 hostage crisis of American Embassy in Tehran. Yet that event and a few other terrorist attacks believed to be committed by groups affiliated or within the power structure of I.R. appear to have had more pronounced political consequences rather than economic effects. Moreover, Iran has continued to sell its oil in the global market, never using it as a political weapon up to now, despite occasional claims from government people. In military arms market, while I.R. has been drawn to the Russian/Chinese products, Middle East Arab countries has replaced Iran as excellent costumers for the American arms producers, spending multiple billion of dollars thanks to the continuous instability in the region. In the meantime, American products reach to the hand of Iranian consumers indirectly through multiple mediators at high prices.
On the other hand, Iranian economy has suffered on multiple sides. Firstly, Iranian properties in the US were blocked due to hostage crisis. Secondly the economic embargo has been kept in place by the US government over three decades of hostility. Thirdly the American governments backed Saddam’s regime militarily during the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war which resulted in the devastation of Iran’s economy and over a million death tolls on the Iranian side. Last but not least, I.R. hostile haranguing toward the US over the years has caused a tense atmosphere in Iranian foreign relations with the other western powers. Due to such tense atmosphere, foreign investment has continued to be nearly nil over the years. Moreover advanced technologies are either banned or paid through the nose to the mediators or replaced by poor Chinese or Russian alternatives, followed in turn by problematic working or development of critical industries such as oil/gas production, power plants, air aviation, etc. Nationwide power plants could hardly produce to their half capacity mostly due to lack of spare parts; sanctions on aviation devices have forced the government to lean toward second-hand Russian or Ukrainian airplanes and poor maintenance of the existing fleet, leading to frequent air crashes. Typical examples are numerous.
In general, the US-laid embargo not only terribly decelerated the economic growth of the nation, but also has changed, in effect, nothing in Islamic Republic’s political trends and stances, if not worsened it.
On the other side of the equation, could anybody give examples of similar effects of I.R. policies on the American economy? I would not wonder if a positive effect emerges at the end of a thorough scientific investigation.
From the Iranian nations’ point of view, Iran is and has continued to be the obvious loser of the equation, insisting on its hard-line stances up to day. Now, I would like to ask American policy-makers, whether it is still wise to wait for the Iranian side to unclench its fist first or not.